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How populists securitize elections to win them: the 2015 double elections in Turkey 
Abstract 
This study presents a new theoretical framework for understanding one of the ways in which 
populists generate support in elections. It argues that populist movements securitize elections 
by triggering perceptions of ontological insecurity among voters. Through this strategy, 
populist movements amplify voters’ negative image of the country they live in and the 
challenges they face, which contributes to populist movements’ electoral success. Building 
upon this theoretical framework, this study offers an explanation for the 2015 double general 
elections in Turkey. The AKP experienced disappointment after losing its parliamentary 
majority in the June 2015 elections. However, the AKP increased its votes by 8.6% in the 
November 2015 elections. Between these two elections, the AKP had used the Kurdish 
question to trigger perceptions of ontological insecurity, which enabled it to securitize the 
elections in November. This strategy helped the AKP win the November elections.  
 




The populist phenomenon has been in ascendance throughout the world, which causes 
democratic backsliding1 even in consolidated democracies. When in office, populist 
movements erode the democratic regime with their Manichean view of society, distaste for 
checks and balances, and intolerance of dissent.2 The literature, therefore, requires more 
research on strategies by which populist movements come to and to stay in power. This study 
focuses on securitization of elections as a particular populist strategy. It demonstrates how 
populists securitize elections by triggering perceptions of ontological insecurity among the 
people to generate support in the elections.   
 
Securitizing elections by triggering ontological insecurities helps populist movements to 
																																																								









1Jan-Werner Muller, What is Populism? (UK: Penguin Books, 2017). 
2 Ibid.  
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promote the perception that the elections are extraordinary moments in which the people 
should choose leaders who can deliver decisive action against ‘existential threats threatening 
the nation’. Populist movements argue that only they can deliver this action, as other political 
actors are weak, indecisive, and/or traitors. This strategy helps populist movements generate 
support among the electorate, as ontologically insecure people seek to get rid of their insecure 
state of existence by electing a ‘strong leader’ capable of eliminating existential threats.    
  
Following this theoretical framework, this study focuses on the 2015 double general elections 
in Turkey. The double general elections in 2015 represent a puzzle in recent Turkish history. 
In the June 2015 elections, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP) was down to 40.9% from 49.9% in the previous elections. This result cost the AKP its 
parliamentary majority. However, instead of buckling under the calls for negotiations for a 
coalition government, the AKP forced snap elections in November 2015. In these elections, 
the AKP proved public opinion polls wrong by garnering 49.5% of the votes. This study 
argues that one of the factors explaining the AKP’s comeback in the November 2015 
elections was the AKP leadership’s ability to draw upon the people’s perceptions of 
ontological insecurity by shifting discourses between the two elections. While the previous 
AKP discourse prioritized a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question, the new discourse 
emphasized existential security threats, which triggered ontological insecurities of the Turkish 
people. The new AKP discourse used ethnic nationalism to create a rally-around-the-flag 
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effect.3 This strategy enabled the AKP to securitize the November 2015 elections, increase its 
votes primarily among the Turkish voters,4 and eventually win the elections.  
 
The following section describes the theoretical framework behind the claims of this study. 
The methodology section explains why discourse analysis is the best strategy for answering 
the research question. The third section summarizes the historical and political background, as 
this context is important for any discourse analysis. The findings section includes the 
comparative analysis of the discourse that the AKP used i) before the June 2015 elections 
when the peace process was officially ongoing and ii) between the two general elections in 
2015. The study ends with concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.  
 
Populism, ontological security, and securitization 
Populism is another contested term in social sciences. It is defined as a thin ideology, which 
considers society to be divided between two antagonistic groups – the pure people and the 
corrupt elite.5 It is also defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader 
seeks or exercises power by direct, unmediated, and uninstitutionalized support from the 
people.6 Others define populism as a political style that grows around a nativistic, 
																																																								
3 Past research demonstrated how political leaders use nationalism in the referendums (and elections) 
to protect their hegemony. Political leaders employ ethnic nationalism in elections to thwart their 
opponents’ attempts to unseat them. For an example, see Dylan O’Driscoll and Bahar Baser, 
“Independence Referendums and Nationalist Rhetoric: the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”, Third World 
Quarterly 40, no: 11 (2019): 2016-2034. 
4 In the November 2015 elections, the AKP increased its votes not only in the Turkish cities but also in 
pre-dominantly Kurdish cities. However, further analysis demonstrates that the increase in AKP 
support among Kurdish voters was limited. Analysis shows that there were two major sources of the 
8.6% increase in AKP votes in the November 2015 elections: ultra-nationalist MHP voters and 
Turkish voters who did not vote in the June 2015 elections. For further information, see KONDA 
Kasim’15 Barometresi, December 1, 2015, https://konda.com.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/KONDA_1Kas%C4%B1m2015SandikveSecmenAnaliziRaporu.pdf: 41-46.  
5 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no: 3 (2004): 541-563. 
6 Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,” 
Comparative Politics 34, no: 1 (2001): 1-22.  
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personalistic, and culturally folksy pole.7 Populism has a chameleonic character.8 It takes a 
variety of forms, echoing different socio-cultural and cultural contexts.9 Populist movements, 
therefore, possess an ideological flexibility allowing them to capitalise on catch-all issues 
including religion, nationalism, and ethnicity10 and to strategically shift their ideology in 
parallel to their goals. In communicating these ideological shifts to the people, populist 
movements use discourse, as spoken or written public statements are important in legitimating 
and animating political action in populist mobilization.11 Similarly, populist movements 
frequently use discourse to trigger perceptions of ontological insecurity,12 enabling them to 
generate public support.  
 
Ontological security refers to a situation in which there is an absence of anxieties and dangers 
and when people’s identities and autonomy are not in question.13 It is about one’s need ‘to 
experience oneself as a whole continuous person in time’.14 Ontological security derives from 
individuals’ reliance on normality and predictability.15 Ontologically secure individuals have 
the confidence that they have “in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of 
																																																								
7 Pierre Ostiguy and Kenneth Roberts, “Putting Trump in Comparative Perspective: Populism and the 
Politicization of the Cultural Low,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 23, no: 1 (2016): 25-50. 
8 Paul Taggart, Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000).   
9 Ibid.; Paul Taggart, “Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe,” Journal of 
Political Ideologies 9, no: 3 (2004): 269-288.  
10 Bilge Yabanci, “Populism as the Problem Child of Democracy: The AKP’s Enduring Appeal and 
the Use of Meso-Level Actors,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no: 4 (2016): 591-617.  
11 Robert Jansen,  “Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism”, Sociological 
Theory 29, no: 2 (2011): 75-96. 
12 Alexandra Homolar and Ronny Scholz, “The Power of Trump Speak: Populist Crisis Narratives and 
Ontological Security,” Cambridge Review of International Relations 32, no: 3 (2019): 344-364. 
13 Ronald Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study In Sanity And Madness (New 
York: Pelican, 1960) 
14 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” 
European Journal of International Relations 12, no: 3 (2006): 341-370, 342. 




the surrounding social and material environment”.16 Routine situations, therefore, constitute 
the core of ontological security.17 Where predictability of the routine is ruptured by societal 
discourses or external threats, the ontologically insecure citizen develops18 as routine 
situations are replaced by (perceptions of) critical situations.19 Hence, ontologically insecure 
citizens suffer from perceptions of the lack of a safe haven20 and are constantly in search of 
one.  
 
Populist movements strategically draw upon people’s need for ontological security to 
generate support in elections.21 Populist movements frame a situation as a crisis and define it 
as an existential threat, as crises serve to legitimize populist governance.22 By promoting a 
specific interpretation of a threat according to which groups are defined,23 populist 
movements use perceived or imagined threats and anxieties that the people experience against 
their culture, religion, and tradition.24 Construction of this crisis-setting helps populist 
movements “amplify voters’ negative image of themselves, the country they live in and the 
challenges they face”, which contributes to their electoral success.25 Where perceptions of 
threats do not exist, populist movements ‘perform the crisis’ by acting as a trigger for crisis,26 
																																																								
16 Zeynep Gulsah Capan and Ayse Zarakol, “Turkey’s Ambivalent Self: Ontological Insecurity in 
‘Kemalism’ versus ‘Erdoganism’,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 32, no: 3 (2019): 263-
282, 266.  
17 Catarina Kinnvall, “Populism, Ontological Insecurity and Hindutva: Modi and the Masculinization 
of Indian politics,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 32, no: 3 (2019): 283-302.	
18 Stuart Croft, Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: The Search for 
Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, no: 4 (2004): 741-767; Alanna Krolikowski, “State 
Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A 
Sceptical View,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no: 1 (2008): 109–133. 
19 Kinnvall, “Populism, Ontological Insecurity” 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.; Homolar and Scholz, “The Power of Trump”  
22 Muller, What is Populism. 
23 Foucault, Michel, Power/knowledge. (Brighton: Harvester, 1980). 
24 Kinnvall, “Populism, Ontological Insecurity.” 
25 Homolar and Scholz, “The Power of Trump”, 346. 
26 Moffitt, “How to Perform.” 
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thereby constructing gaps in people’s sense of ontological security.  
 
Election campaigns are unique moments where this populist strategy is crystallized. In their 
election campaigns, populist movements promote a specific reading of elections, in which 
each election is represented as a crisis moment at which the public must make a vital decision 
against some ‘existential threat’. Once the ‘referent’ group accepts this discursive articulation, 
two developments follow. First, populists’ articulation of the opposition takes hold and 
his/her supporters come to see the opposition candidate as an agent of ontological insecurity. 
Now, the opposition is not only a political opponent but also part of the enemy threatening the 
nation. Second, the use of extraordinary measures to prevent a possible victory of the 
opposition is seen as justified by the populist movement’s referent group. This is because the 
opposition is not simply a political opponent but also an active agent of ontological insecurity, 
whose very existence threatens the nation. 
 
The result of this populist strategy is the securitization of elections. Securitization constructs 
the ‘other’ as an existential threat to a referent group, and calls for extraordinary measures to 
combat this threat.27 The act of securitization dramatizes an issue as vital and removes it from 
the sphere of mundane public debate.28 Securitization also causes the demands, grievances, 
and agendas of opposition groups to be labeled as seditious,29 paving the way for the 
demonization of the opposition. The following examples from the US, Hungary, and 
Venezuela demonstrate instances in which populist leaders securitized elections by triggering 
																																																								
27 Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
28 Alper Kaliber and Nathalie Tocci, “Civil Society and Transformation of Turkey’s Kurdish 
Question,” Security Dialogue. 41, no: 2 (2010): 91-215. 
29 Matthew Weiss, “From Constructive Engagement to Renewed Estrangement? Securitization and 




perceptions of ontological insecurity. As these examples demonstrate, populist leaders first 
define a crisis and then suggest that the elections are a critical turning point for the solution of 
the crisis. Frequently, a possible success of a political opponent is presented as an alternative 
scenario in which the crisis would exacerbate and threaten the nation, causing the 
securitization of the elections. 
 
In his presidential campaign, Trump constructed an image of ‘America in crisis’ to garner 
support.30 He demonized irregular migrants with labels such as criminals, rapists, or 
terrorists,31 thereby turning them into agents of ontological insecurity. He argued that every 
day the US border remains open, innocent Americans are killed.32 Trump suggested that while 
his opponent, Clinton, was soft on this threat, he would deal with irregular migrants 
decisively to protect the nation. In a similar vein, before the 2018 elections, Venezuela’s 
Maduro argued that the country was in the midst of an economic war led by the US.33 He cast 
his campaign as a battle against imperialist powers (and their domestic collaborators) 
determined to seize Venezuela’s oil wealth.34 Similarly, Hungarian PM Orban, before the 
2018 elections, argued that Hungary’s Christian culture was under threat from ‘millions of 
immigrants’ and European leaders who wanted to let them in.35 Orban suggested that the 
outcome of the elections would be decisive in the fight to defend the country against this 
threat.  
																																																								
30 Homolar and Scholz, “The Power of Trump.” 
31 Ibid.  
32 NBC New York, “Trump: Open Border Cost American Lives”, September 17, 2016, 
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/trump-speaks-at-anti-illegal-immigration-
groups-conference/2038428/ 
33 Reuters, May 15, 2018, “https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election/maduro-vows-
economic-change-for-venezuelas-rebirth-before-vote-idUSKCN1IG31S” 
34Reuters, May 3, 2018, “https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election/venezuelas-maduro-
defies-foreign-censure-offers-prize-to-voters-idUSKBN1I41KK”  





Historical and political background 
The AKP and populism 
The AKP has been in power in Turkey since the November 2002 elections, making it the 
longest-ruling populist party in Europe.36 Some scholars argue that the AKP became populist 
in 2007 when threatened by the Kemalist elite and the uncompromising opposition,37 while 
others suggest that populist tones have been present in the AKP since its inception.38 Despite 
the disagreement over the origins of the AKP’s populism, there is a consensus that the AKP 
displays features associated with populism, including (1) anti-institutionalism,39 (2) anti-
establishment and anti-elite discourse,40 (3) antagonizing the people by mobilizing existing 
divisions within society and demonizing the opposition,41 (4) an emphasis on national will 
																																																								
36 Bilge Yabanci and Dane Taleski, “‘Co-opting ‘the Religion’: How Ruling Populists in Turkey and 
Macedonia Sacralise the Majority,” Religion, State & Society 46, no: 3 (2018): 283-304.  
37 Sakir Dincsahin, “A Symptomatic Analysis of the Justice and Development Party’s Populism in 
Turkey, 2007-2010,” Government and Opposition, 47, no:4 (2010): 618-640; Orcun Selçuk, “Strong 
Presidents and Weak Institutions: Populism in Turkey, Venezuela and Ecuador,” Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies 16, no:4 (2016): 571-589; Murat Somer, “Turkey: The Slippery Slope from 
Reformist to Revolutionary Polarization and Democratic Breakdown,” ANNALS, AAPSS 681 (2019): 
42-61.    
38 Yabanci and Taleski, “‘Co-opting ‘the Religion’; Burak Bilgehan Ozpek and Nebahat Tanriverdi 
Yaşar, “Populism and Foreign Policy in Turkey under the AKP Rule,” Turkish Studies 19, no:2 
(2018): 198-216.  
39 Dincsahin, “A symptomatic analysis”; Hakki Tas, “Turkey – from Tutelary to Delegative 
Democracy,” Third World Quarterly 36, no:4 (2015): 776-791; Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu, 
“Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 37, no: 9 (2016): 1581-1606 
Antonino, Castaldo, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey,” Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies 18, no: 4 (2018): 467-484.  
40 Ozpek and Tanriverdi Yaşar, “Populism and Foreign”; Yabanci,, “Populism as the Problem”; Bill 
Park, “Populism and Islamism in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 19, no:2 (2018): 169-175; Tugce Ercetin 
and Emre Erdoğan, “How Turkey’s Repetitive Elections Affected the Populist Tone in the Discourses 
of The Justice and Development Party Leaders,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 44, no: 4 (2018): 382–
398; Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no: 4 (2016): 591-617.   
41 Selçuk, “Strong Presidents”; Yabanci, “Populism as the Problem”; Erçetin, and Erdoğan, “How 
Turkey’s Repetitive”; Park, “Populism and Islamism”; Menderes Çınar, “Turkey’s ‘Western” or 
‘Muslim’ Identity and the AKP’s Civilization Discourse,” Turkish Studies 19, no: 2 (2018): 176-197.; 
H. Bahadir Türk, “‘Populism as a Medium of Mass Communication’: The Case of Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan,” International Area Studies Review 21, no: 2 (2018): 150-168. 
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and the association of national will with the leader, Erdoğan,42 and (5) mobilization of the 
masses for political goals.43 
 
The AKP has used populism to hold onto power while ideological discourses voiced by its 
leadership demonstrated inconsistencies.44 It has adopted different ideologies and norms 
depending on the context and on its political goals.45 When founded in 2002, the AKP was 
advertised as a conservative-democratic political party that occupied centre-right of the 
political spectrum.46 Advertising itself as a conservative-democrat party enabled the AKP to 
adapt a thin understanding of Islam and to increase its appeal to the pious and the liberal 
segments of the society simultaneously.47 Therefore, Islamism, which some consider as an 
internal feature of the AKP, was used instrumentally by the AKP leadership.48 The AKP has 
used Islamism to stress the alien nature of the Kemalist elite in domestic politics.49 The AKP 
has also used Islam to counter challenges to its grip on power and to create cross-class and 
cross-ethnicity popular support for its rule.50 For instance, the AKP drew strong support from 
conservative Kurds between 2002 and June 2015 by using an Islamic discourse. However, 
when the peace process between the armed Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkeran 
																																																								
42 Tas, “Turkey – from Tutelary”; Castaldo, “Populism and Competitive”; Selçuk, “Strong 
Presidents”; Yabanci, “Populism as the Problem”; Erçetin, and Erdoğan, “How Turkey’s Repetitive”; 
Türk,”Populism as a Medium” 
43 Yabanci and Taleski, “Co-opting ‘the Religion”; Tas, “Turkey – from Tutelary”; Ozpek, and 
Tanriverdi Yaşar, “Populism and Foreign Policy”; Yabanci, “Populism as the Problem”; Castaldo, 
“Populism and Competitive”; Türk,”Populism as a Medium”. 
44 Ozpek, and Tanriverdi Yaşar, “Populism and Foreign Policy” 
45 Ibid.  
46 William Hale, “Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts,” Turkish Studies 6, no: 
2 (2005): 293-310. 
47 Esen Kirdis and Amina Drmiheur, “The Rise of Populism? Comparing Incumbent Pro-Islamic 
Parties in Turkey And Morocco,” Turkish Studies 17, no: 4 (2016): 599-617. 
48	Çınar, “Turkey’s ‘Western’ or”	
49	Park, “Populism and Islamism”	
50	Yabanci and Taleski, “Co-opting ‘the Religion”	
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Kurdistan, PKK) and the Turkish state officially ended in July 2015, the AKP shifted to a 
new discourse, which prioritized ethno-nationalism.  
 
Kurdish question 
After the foundation of the Republic in 1923, aiming to build a nation-state built upon the 
ethno-cultural dominance of the Turkish identity, the state elite suppressed other ethnic 
identities. However, Kurds – unlike non-Muslim minorities – were considered to be 
assimilable into a Turkish identity.51 Thereafter, the state policy was to suppress public 
manifestations of Kurdish identity and attempt to assimilate Kurds into Turkish identity.52 
The official policy suggested that Kurds were ‘mountain Turks’ who forgot their Turkishness 
because of the multi-ethnic structure of the Ottoman Empire.53 Kurds’ cultural and political 
rights emanating from their identity was denied by the state.54  Furthermore, the state 
considered expressions of Kurdish identity as a threat to the nation, resulting in the 
securitization of the Kurdish question,55 which also caused successive governments to avoid 
political means to deal with the issue. This meant the legitimization of the use of 
extraordinary measures to deal with the issue.56  
 
																																																								
51 Cenk Saracoglu, “‘Exclusive Recognition’: The New Dimensions of the Question of Ethnicity and 
Nationalism In Turkey,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, no: 4 (2019): 640-658.   
52 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “When Democratization Radicalizes? The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in 
Turkey,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no: 6 (2010): 775-789. 
53 Senem Aslan, “Everyday Forms of State Power and The Kurds in the Early Turkish Republic,” 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 43, no: 1 (2011): 75-93. 
54 Mesut Yegen, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 34, no: 4 (1999): 555-568. 
55 Burak Bilgehan Ozpek, “Paradigm Shift between Turkey and Kurds: from ‘Clash of the Titans’ to 
‘Game of Thrones’,” Middle East Critique 27, no: 1 (2018): 43-60. 
56 Kaliber and Tocci, “Civil Society”; Maurizio Geri, “From a History of Exclusion to the 
Securitization of the Kurdish Issue: A Step of Democratic Regression in Turkey,” Muslim World 
Journal of Human Rights 13, no: 1 (2016): 25-43.  
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The period after the 1980 military coup was important in shaping Kurds’ relations to the state. 
After the coup, the state banned Kurdish in broadcasting, press, and public life.57 After the 
start of the armed conflict between the security forces and the PKK, the Turkish state declared 
a state of emergency in southeast Turkey, which lasted from 1987 to 2002, imposing heavy 
costs upon Kurds. Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and torture were quite 
commonplace in this period. 58  Between 1980 and 2001, 1,353 people were forcibly 
disappeared by the security forces and thousands of murders have remained unsolved.59  
 
The AKP and the Kurdish question 
Pragmatism, rather than reformism, has defined the AKP’s treatment of Kurds.60 Before the 
AKP, the mainstream political parties in Turkey could not develop approaches independent of 
the dominant security elite (i.e., the military).61 The AKP, however, tried to convince Kurds 
that their approach to the Kurdish question would be different from that of previous political 
parties. The 2002 AKP party program significantly diverged from the security paradigm, 
which had previously dominated the state policy towards Kurds. This program suggested that 
security-oriented approaches to the Kurdish question exacerbate the problem. Accordingly, 
one of the policies that the AKP suggested was an immediate abolishment of the state of 
emergency that had paralyzed the region since 1987. This program also argued that 
																																																								
57 Zelal B. Kizilkan-Kisacik, “The Impact of the EU on Minority Rights: The Kurds as a Case,” in The 
Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation, and Reconciliation, ed. 
Cengiz Gunes and Welat Zeydanlioglu (New York: Routledge, 2014), 205-224. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Özgur Sevgi Göral, Ayhan Işık, and Özlem Kaya, The Unspoken Truth: Enforced Disappearances. 
(İstanbul: Truth Justice Memory Center, 2013).  




broadcasting and cultural activities in languages other than Turkish are not harmful to the 
nation.62 On the contrary, it would contribute to the solidarity and unity of the nation.  
 
The AKP’s approach towards Kurds was hardly surprising given that its position was fragile 
due to the threat of the security establishment, which made the search for alliances a necessity 
for the AKP. The AKP, therefore, had followed an agenda that would benefit potential allies 
such as conservatives, pro-EU circles, business associations, and Kurds.63 Furthermore, de-
securitization of the Kurdish question would weaken the military tutelage over Turkish 
politics given that the military used its unique position in the fight against the PKK to hold 
onto political power.64 Hence, if the AKP were able to de-securitize the Kurdish question, the 
Kemalist elite would lose a significant cornerstone of its political power. This would provide 
the AKP with stronger prospects for survival against the Kemalist elite.   
 
The AKP, therefore, was pragmatic in its treatment of Kurds. Soon after coming to power in 
2002, the AKP abolished the state of emergency covering Kurdish-populated cities. When in 
power, the AKP had continued criticizing the oppressive state tradition of the previous elite, 
which contributed to its image as a government that was different in terms of ethnic politics.65 
The AKP introduced successive waves of reconciliation projects under different names, such 
as “Democratic Initiative” (Demokratik Acilim), “National Unity and Solidarity” (Milli Birlik 
ve Beraberlik), “the Oslo Process”, and “the Peace Process”.66 Kurds found these attempts at 
																																																								
62 AK Parti Programı: Kalkinma ve Demokratiklesme Programı, February 11, 2002, 
https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11543/926/200205071.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y  
63 Ozpek, “Paradigm Shift” 
64 Ibid. 
65 Onur Gunay and Erdem Yoruk, “Governing Ethnic Unrest: Political Islam and the Kurdish Conflict 




reconciliation credible,67 as the AKP was not considered one of the political parties that 
symbolized the violence and ethnic discrimination of the 1990s.  
 
Methodology 
Studying discourse is important because discourse is ‘institutionalized structures of meaning’ 
that channel political thought and action in certain directions.68 Political leaders/movements 
use discourse to persuade the public of the necessity and appropriateness of a course of 
action.69 Discourse also allows political leaders/movements to establish a dominant narrative 
of an issue, setting the parameters of the discussion thereafter.70 These characteristics of 
discourse make it an important asset for populist movements, which rely on unmediated 
communication71 and public statements72 rather than formal institutions in their 
communication with the people.  
 
This study focuses on different discourses adopted by the AKP in two periods: the discourse 
between January 2013 and June 2015 and the discourse between June 2015 and November 
2015. A keyword search was conducted for the AKP leadership’s speeches and statements to 
the general public for these dates. As the aim was to find speeches and statements that 
revealed the AKP discourse about the Kurdish question, the peace process, and the double 
elections, keywords such as the elections (seçimler, Haziran seçimleri, Kasım seçimleri, 
önümüzdeki seçimler), the Kurdish question (Kürt sorunu, terör sorunu), the peace process 
																																																								
67 For example, in the 2007 elections, the AKP garnered 40% of the votes in Diyarbakir, making it the 
second largest political party in Diyarbakir after pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party.  
68 Vivian Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. 
Annual Review of Political Science, no. 11 (2008): 303-326.   
69 Ibid.  
70 Joshua W. Busby, “Narrative and the Making of US National Security” International Politics 
Review 4, no: 2 (2016): 108-111. 	
71 Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested”  
72 Jansen, “Populist Mobilization” 
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(barış süreci, çözüm süreci), the People’s Democracy Party (Halkların Demokrasi Partisi, 
HDP), and the PKK were used to locate these particular speeches and statements. As a result 
of this search, 57 speeches and statements by the AKP leadership on the Kurdish question, the 
peace process, and the elections were retrieved. 44 of these speeches belonged to Erdoğan. In 
the final step of the analysis, these speeches and statements were read to determine recurring 
patterns and themes specific to these two different periods.   
 
Findings  
The comparative analysis revealed the triggers that the AKP used to build perceptions of 
ontological insecurity and to securitize the November 2015 elections. The analysis revealed 
that the AKP discourse between January 2013 and June 2015 aimed to de-securitize the 
Kurdish question. Analysis demonstrated that, after the disappointment of the June 2015 
elections, the AKP leadership started using a new discourse. The new AKP discourse between 
the two general elections included four core elements allowing them to build ontological 
insecurities and securitize the snap elections: i) prioritization of the existential threats against 
the nation and re-securitization of the Kurdish question, ii) adoption of Turkish nationalism, 
iii) demonization of the HDP and equating it with terrorism, and iv) equating the AKP’s 
victory in snap elections to the only way out of ‘chaos’.  
 
The peace process: January 2013-June 2015 
In December 2012, Erdoğan announced that negotiations between the imprisoned PKK leader 
Öcalan and the Turkish state were ongoing.73 The symbolic start of the peace process was the 
Kurdish New Year (Newroz) celebrations on 21 March 2013, when Öcalan’s letter on the 
																																																								
73 Cemal Ozkahraman, “Failure of Peace Talks between Turkey and the PKK: Victim of Traditional 
Policy or of Geopolitical Shifts in the Middle East?,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 4 no:1 
(2017): 50-66.  
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peace process was read to more than one million people in Diyarbakir.74 This process was 
accompanied by the AKP’s attempts to de-securitize the Kurdish question. For example, the 
government urged the establishment of the Committee of the Wise People (Akil İnsanlar 
Heyeti), which was a 63-person committee whose members had been chosen from among 
intellectuals, civil society activists, academics, and artists.75 The mission of this committee 
was to convince the public of the viability of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question.  
 
The AKP also used discourse to de-securitize the Kurdish question during the same period. In 
a well-known speech in 2013, Erdoğan argued that: 
“Those claiming that their race, tribe or clan is superior to others are in the same path with the 
devil. […] We are all members of the same nation in the Turkish Republic. In this 
conceptualization of the nation, there is the Turk; there is the Kurd; there is the Laz; there is 
the Circassian. […] Those promoting ethnic nationalism are in deviance and in malice. They 
are in sedition. With the permission of God, we are going to be in one in solidarity, alive and 
strong as we have been for thousands of years. […] During this [peace] process, nobody 
should confront us with Kurdishness or Turkishness. We are a government, which trample on 
any kind of nationalism.”76    
 
This speech was significant at different levels. First, Erdoğan used inclusive language 
assigning the same level of importance to different ethnic groups in Turkey. This was in 
contrast to the Republican elite, who emphasized the primacy of Turkish identity over other 
ethnic identities.77 Second, Erdoğan discredited ‘ethnic nationalism’, which had contributed to 
the securitization of the Kurdish question in the past. Third, he referred to an Islamic 
argument, asserting that divisions based on ethnic identities are harmful to the unity of 
Muslims. According to this argument, the Islamic brotherhood of Muslims (ummah) should 
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prevail over ethnic parochialisms. This demonstrates that during the peace process, Erdoğan’s 
inclusive discourse towards Kurds was based on Islamism.78  
 
On another occasion, Erdoğan built on the same discourse when talking about the peace 
process: 
“We are the only political party in this country, which would not allow discrimination based 
on ethnic identities. Kurds, Lazs, Circassians, Georghians, Abhazs, Romans and Pomaks, are 
my brothers as much as Turks. […] In contrast to the CHP, we think that discriminative 
nationalism is doing unjust to this nation’s history. In contrast to the MHP, we will never 
encourage the kind of nationalism, which is tainted by the language of hatred, anger, division 
and discrimination.”79    
 
This speech, in addition to rejecting ethnic nationalism in favor of inclusive nationalism, set a 
tone aiming to differentiate the AKP from the opposition in its approach to the Kurdish 
question. Erdoğan suggested that while the other major political parties promote exclusionary 
nationalism, the AKP does not prioritize one ethnic group over others. This discourse was 
part of the strategy suggesting that the AKP is different from previous political parties, which 
created the Kurdish question. Other leading names of the AKP highlighted the same point 
about the opposition parties. They blamed the opposition parties for Kurds’ problems and 
argued that these parties aggravated the Kurdish question. A prominent AKP MP argued that:  
“Both CHP and MHP live on the same problem [Kurdish question]. The CHP is the cause of 
the problem and the MHP exacerbates it. The CHP’s monist and fascist mindset is the cause of 
the Kurdish question in Turkey. […] The MHP, with its nationalism based on the bloods of 
martyred soldiers, aggravated Kurdish nationalism and caused the PKK to thrive.”80  
 
																																																								
78 During the campaign process leading to the June 2015 elections, in predominantly Kurdish cities, 
Erdoğan campaigned with a Kurdish-translated Quran in his hand. In Kurdish-populated cities, 
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79 Sabah, “Gerekirse Baldiran Zehiri Icerim,” February 26, 2013, 
https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/02/26/gerekirse-baldiran-zehri-icerim 




Therefore, during the peace process, the AKP discourse aimed to de-securitize the Kurdish 
question. The discourse was inclusionary towards the Kurdish ethnic identity and 
exclusionary towards the opposition, as they were held responsible for the Kurdish question.  
 
The end of the peace process and the snap general elections: June 2015 and November 
2015 
In December 2014, the pro-Kurdish HDP’s co-leader, Demirtaş, explained that unlike 
previous pro-Kurdish parties, the HDP candidates would enter the elections under the HDP 
party ticket instead of with independent candidates.81 This decision was risky, as i) there were 
doubts about the HDP’s ability to pass the 10% national threshold, and ii) it could alienate the 
AKP if the HDP were to cause a major decline in the number of AKP MPs in the 
parliament.82 Indeed, in the June 2015 elections, the AKP won 40.9% of the votes, a result 
that prevented the establishment of an AKP single-party government. This outcome was 
unexpected for the AKP leadership, as they had anticipated that the peace process would 
boost their votes among Kurds. The pro-Kurdish HDP garnered 13.1% of the votes. 
Furthermore, the HDP was able to increase its votes not only in predominantly Kurdish cities 
but also in the metropolises of western Turkey.83 Only one day after the elections, the deputy 
PM Akdoğan, revealed their discontent with the HDP’s role in the AKP’s poor standing in the 
elections. He said: “From this point forward, the HDP can only shoot a movie about the peace 
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process”.84 His statement hinted that the AKP was either planning to exclude the HDP from 
the peace process or to completely close the door on the peace process. Unsurprisingly, the 
peace process officially ended on 24 July 2015 after the Turkish army bombarded the PKK 
positions in Qandil Mountain.85 
 
Research points to several reasons for the failure of the peace process and the re-securitization 
of the Kurdish question. These include the de-Europeanization of Turkey and its deteriorating 
relations with the EU, the Syrian civil war and the presence of autonomous Kurdish cantons 
in northern Syria, the emergence of a new generation of Kurdish politicians who were not 
willing to support Erdoğan’s agenda, and the instrumentalization of the peace process by the 
AKP government.86 Indeed, a major weakness of the peace process was the fact that the AKP 
tied the peace process to its success in the elections as well as the Kurdish movement’s 
support for Erdoğan’s agenda for a presidential system.87 Erdoğan emphasized the importance 
of a strong incumbent party with 400 MPs88 to the success of the peace process.89 When the 
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new generation of Kurdish politicians declined to extend support for his political agenda,90 
Erdoğan’s attitudes towards the peace process started to change.91 This is why the HDP’s 
December 2014 declaration that the HDP candidates would enter the elections with the party 
ticket was an important major turning. This claim is also supported by the fact that though the 
peace process was officially ongoing in 2015, no visible progress was made towards peace 
after the HDP’s declaration to enter the elections with the party ticket. This was despite the 
fact that a major step was taken towards peace with the Dolmabahçe Consensus. Later, 
Erdoğan even argued that he had never endorsed the Dolmabahçe Consensus, causing great 
controversy in his own ranks as well. While this and the other factors listed above are 
important for understanding the collapse of the peace process, this study argues that the 
AKP’s willingness to reverse the electoral defeat in the June 2015 elections is another factor 
that needs attention.92  
 
The outcome of the June 2015 elections revealed the collapse of the AKP’s strategy in the 
elections.93 Far from obtaining the supermajority that would allow Erdoğan to implement his 
agenda, the AKP lost its majority in the parliament. Not only the HDP but also the ultra-
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nationalist Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), which was highly 
critical of the peace process, increased its votes at the expense of the AKP. Rather than 
accepting the election results and seeking a coalition government with other political parties 
in the parliament, the AKP, under Erdoğan’s guidance, implemented a series of moves to 
reverse this electoral defeat. First, Erdoğan obstructed PM Davutoğlu’s attempts to form a 
coalition government with the CHP or the MHP.94 Second, he forced snap elections scheduled 
for November 2015. Third, the AKP leadership triggered perceptions of ontological 
insecurities, enabling the AKP to securitize the November elections.  
 
As noted earlier, populists, in line with the changing political and social context, shift their 
discourse strategically.95 In their discursive engagement with the voters, populists refer to 
perceived or imagined threats to exploit people’s need for ontological security,96 which in 
turn increases the electoral support for populists.97 Where the perception of a threat does not 
exist, populists trigger the crisis98 and perceptions of ontological insecurity. In 2015, Turkish 
public opinion was already receptive to a shift towards a discourse prioritizing ontological 
insecurities. Turkey was shaken by three major terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Islamic 
State (ISIS) in 2015. In June, an ISIS attack at the HDP meeting in Diyarbakir killed 5 people. 
In July, another ISIS attack in Suruç killed 33 people, who were mostly leftist university 
students. In the bloodiest terrorist attack in Turkish history, ISIS killed 109 peace protesters in 
Ankara in October 2015.  
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In this political and social context, the AKP used the Kurdish question to trigger people’s 
perceptions of ontological insecurity and securitize the elections. The fact that the AKP 
centered its discourse on the Kurdish question after June 2015 while overlooking the ISIS 
threat stemmed from two reasons. First, the conflictual history between Kurds and the Turkish 
state as well as the forced migration of Kurds caused Turks to establish an exclusionary and 
antagonistic relationship with Kurds,99 while the ISIS threat in Turkey did not carry the same 
historical baggage. Accordingly, the Turkish people were more receptive to a discourse that 
emphasized the Kurdish question as an existential threat to the nation. Second, the AKP was 
able to couple the PKK with the HDP in the elections, while the AKP could not implement a 
similar strategy for the ISIS threat. The Kurdish question, therefore, was more suitable for 
securitizing the elections because, in its election campaign, the AKP was able to present the 
HDP as an extension of the PKK.  
 
The AKP officially ended the peace process on 24 July 2015, after it became clear that the 
peace process did not help the AKP’s electoral standing.100 Thereafter, the new AKP 
discourse prioritized ethnic nationalism and triggers of ontological insecurity, which would 
allow the AKP to maintain its hegemony.101 This new discourse aimed to develop a new 
mode of ethnic nationalism whereby overt hostility against the Kurdish opposition became the 
major strategy for garnering Turkish nationalist support.102 The new discourse included four 
core elements allowing it to build ontological insecurities and then securitize the November 
elections: i) prioritization of the existential threats against the nation and re-securitization of 
the Kurdish question, ii) adoption of Turkish nationalism, iii) demonization of the HDP and 
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equating it with terrorism, and iv) equating the AKP’s victory in snap elections with the only 
way out of ‘chaos’. 
 
While the AKP discourse before the June elections emphasized normalization, a core element 
of the AKP discourse after the June 2015 elections was the prioritization of the existential 
threats against the nation and re-securitization of the Kurdish question. In a statement in 
September 2015, Erdoğan argued that those who wanted him to lose did not care about 
Turkey. He said that nobody should focus on such issues while “Turkey is fighting against the 
PKK terrorism, DHKP-C terrorism, ISIS threat and the treasons of parallel state organization 
[Gulenists]”.103 In September 2015, Erdoğan and PM Davutoğlu joined a meeting named 
“One voice against terror”. In this meeting, both Erdoğan and Davutoğlu emphasized the 
terrorist threats that the nation was facing.104 The AKP leadership also re-securitized the 
Kurdish question by prioritizing the armed struggle against the PKK while political solutions 
were taken off the table. He argued: 
“We are will continue our fight until terrorist organizations are no more threats to our country, 
until those weapons are laid down and buried. […] We will continue our fight until concrete is 
poured [on weapons] and not one terrorist remains within our borders. […] We never 
considered the peace process as a means to legitimize terrorism or give them elbowroom. […] 
Unfortunately, they [the PKK and the HDP] did not want to understand this. Therefore, the 
peace process is now in the refrigerator.”105   
 
Public opinion polls demonstrated the success of the new discourse. An IPSOS survey found 
that while in May 2015 only 14% of the Turkish population considered the peace 
process/terrorism to be the most important problem in Turkey, this figure increased to 47% in 
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August 2015 and a staggering 72% in September 2015.106 One should note that the increase in 
the percentage of people considering the peace process/terrorism to be the most important 
problem occurred before the October 2015 bombings in Ankara – the biggest terrorist attack 
in Turkish history. This increase also occurred before the start of the ditch conflicts between 
the state security forces and the PKK, which stormed Kurdish-populated cities in Turkey. 
Therefore, the new AKP discourse had started to shape public opinion in Turkey well before 
these bloody events.     
 
The second element of the new discourse was the adoption of a nationalist discourse.107 To 
get nationalist support, the AKP leadership followed a more nationalist and militarist 
agenda.108 Tuğrul Türkeş, an MP from the ultranationalist MHP, was invited to be a minister 
in the interim government in August 2015, and later resigned from the MHP to join the AKP 
ranks.109 Erdoğan also adopted a nationalist terminology in the course of the campaign for the 
snap elections. On several occasions, he asked the people to send “550 native and national 
MPs to the parliament”.110 In a speech in October, nationalist overtones were strong. Erdoğan 
argued:  
 
“We have only one flag; do we have another one? Sadly, people carrying a second flag (the 
HDP) can get votes in this country. […] Without any shame they claim that they have no 
problem with the flag. I don’t know if you [the HDP] have a problem with the flag but I know 
that you have a problem with the Turkish flag. […] You are against even our national anthem 
because you could never be [a part of] the one nation; [a part of] the one flag, and [a part of] 
the one homeland. You have always sided with separatism.”111  
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In another speech, Erdoğan argued that the nation was threatened by terrorism. He argued that 
the nation would neutralize these threats by uniting around the principle of “one nation, one 
flag, one homeland, and one state”.112 
 
 
The third core element of the AKP discourse was the demonization of the HDP and equating 
it with the PKK. In one of his speeches, while referring to the HDP, Erdoğan asked:  
“Is shielding terrorism one of the duties of a political party? [...] Is politics about protecting 
terrorists and targeting security forces with lies, smears and distortions? [...]. 1 November 
[elections] should be a milestone; it should be a rebirth. With this rebirth, in this country God 
willing, we are going to bury terrorism under the ground.”113    
 
In another speech in October 2015, Erdoğan argued: 
“Those who talk about peace when they go to the west are the same people who bomb the 
hospital in Şemdinli, police stations, mosques, and the airport. On the one hand, you talk 
about peace and on the other hand, you terrorize everywhere in collaboration with the PKK, 
which you [the HDP] rely on. I address my nation and the people of the region [Kurdish 
populated cities], if you are not going to teach a lesson to those [the HDP] who rely on the 
terrorist organization in 1 November elections, when are you going to teach them a lesson?”114  
 
This element of the new discourse enabled the AKP to de-legitimize the HDP as a legal actor 
of Turkish politics. It created an atmosphere in which the HDP, which was presented as an 
extension of the PKK, was equated with terrorism. A possible HDP success in the November 
elections was presented as a source of ontological insecurity for the Turkish people. An AKP 
MP manifested this feeling in the following words: “I think if the HDP passes the threshold or 
gets 14-15% as claimed, it will cause more violence”.115 Hence, the November elections were 
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securitized, as the possible success of the HDP was displayed as a ‘security threat’ and 
defeating the HDP (thereby, the PKK) was tied to the outcome of this election.116 
 
The last element of the AKP discourse was to equate the success of the AKP in the snap 
general elections with the only way out of chaos. The campaign slogan for the November 
2015 elections was ‘We are walking towards stability’. Accordingly, themes such as stability, 
tranquility, and ‘the way out of chaos’ were repeatedly emphasized throughout the campaign. 
It was argued that only the AKP single-party government could deliver these public goods, 
whereas other election outcomes would only exacerbate the security situation in Turkey. The 
then-PM Davutoğlu argued that: 
“1 November 2015 will be the path to hope, not to despair or anxiety. Turkey will say ‘trust’ 
and ‘stability’ again. It will say no to chaos. Turkey will say ‘No’ to darkness and unknown 
and ‘Yes’ to justice and development’.”117   
 
This element of the discourse was widely circulated at the local level by the AKP 
representatives. For instance, the AKP candidate in Van argued that: 
“One cannot talk about stability, tranquility and peace where the AKP does not exist […] 
When there is the AKP, there is tranquility, stability, and peace. Think about the opposite. 
There is none of these without the AKP.”118  
 
This core element of the new discourse signaled to the citizens that only the AKP single-party 
government could end the people’s ontological insecurities. While the opposition parties and 
coalition governments were associated with instability, terrorism, and lack of a resolve to 
fight existential threats, it was argued that the AKP had the determination and power to bring 
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about stability and end all existential threats, which were caused by the loss of the AKP 
single-party government in the June 2015 elections.  
 
Conclusion 
Populist movements thrive in extraordinary times. They use perceptions of crisis to convince 
the people that their message is important and urgent.119 They ‘perform the crisis’120 to 
inculcate a perception of an existential threat – to go beyond the limits of mundane politics 
and convince their audience to vote for them. A particular strategy to go beyond mundane 
politics is creating perceptions of ontological insecurity that would lead to the securitization 
of the elections. This study suggested that one of the reasons for the AKP’s ability to reverse 
the election results in less than 5 months was its ability to create perceptions of ontological 
insecurity and to securitize the elections by building upon people’s ontological insecurity 
perceptions.    
 
This study argued that the AKP’s deliberate decision to use a new discourse enabled it to 
recover its losses in the November 2015 elections. The new discourse triggered perceptions of 
ontological insecurity by prioritizing threats against the nation and re-securitizing the Kurdish 
question. The HDP was portrayed as an extension of the PKK and an agent of ontological 
insecurity in the elections. The new discourse, therefore, securitized the snap general elections 
by equating the pro-Kurdish HDP with the PKK. Thereafter, the November 2015 elections 
were presented as extraordinary elections that could have dire consequences for the nation if 
the AKP were not victorious. This strategy worked well. In the words of a voter who shifted 
her vote to the AKP in the snap elections, “If I had voted for another party, this party would 
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not have showed a governing style as stable as that of Erdoğan. I thought that other parties 
could not resolve the terror problem. The AKP did show stability for coping with terror”.121 
 
While this study focused on the Turkish case, there are lessons for other countries. For 
populist movements, every election is an opportunity to promote perceptions of threat that 
allegedly require immediate and extraordinary action. Trump’s 2016 campaign in the US and 
the Johnson campaign in the UK in 2019 demonstrated how populists promote perceptions of 
urgency (e.g., Get Brexit Done) and refer to existential threats (e.g., migrants are rapists) to 
convince constituents that these elections are extraordinary elections requiring voters to make 
some crucial decisions. In other words, populist movements securitize elections by referring 
to elements that ‘threaten the nation’ and require ‘decisive and extraordinary’ action, which 
only the populist leader can deliver. These strategies, while benefiting populist movements, 
harm democracy, as securitization obstructs a meaningful discussion of political issues. 
Accordingly, one particular task awaiting proponents of democracy is to develop strategies 
that could prevent populist movements from hijacking the political agenda in general and the 
mainstream media in particular. This topic however is beyond the scope of this study and can 
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